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BORN TO TAKE RISK? THE EFFECT OF CEO BIRTH ORDER
ON STRATEGIC RISK TAKING
ROBERT J. CAMPBELL
University of Nebraska-Lincoln
SEUNG-HWAN JEONG
Georgia State University
SCOTT D. GRAFFIN
University of Georgia
The importance of birth order has been the subject of debate for centuries, and has captured the attention of the general public and researchers alike. Despite this interest,
scholars have little understanding of the impact birth order has on CEOs and their strategic decisions. With this in mind, we develop theory that explains how CEO birth order
may be associated with strategic risk taking. Drawing from evolutionary theory arguments related to birth order, we theorize that CEO birth order is positively associated with
strategic risk taking; that is, earlier-born CEOs will take less risk than later-born CEOs. As
evolutionary theory proposes that birth order effects are driven by sibling rivalry, we also
argue that this relationship is moderated by three factors related to sibling rivalry: age gap
between a CEO and the closest born sibling, CEO age, and the presence of a sibling CEO.
Our results provide support for our theorizing and suggest that birth order may have
important implications for organizations. We believe this study helps advance strategic
management research, the broader multidisciplinary “family science” literature, and the
much-needed cross-pollination of ideas between the two.

“Birth order is a human experience that is one of the
most pervasive and universally thought to determine
who we are.” (Damian & Roberts, 2015: 96)

Radish, 2002; Radovanovic & Lebowitz, 2016). Research across disciplines, including education and
the health sciences, has also highlighted birth order’s
influence on diverse behaviors, such as school attendance (e.g., Emerson & Souza, 2008) and smoking
(e.g., Juon, Shin, & Nam, 1995).
While birth order captures important early-life
family-domain experiences, within upper echelons research, as well as the broader management
literature, “this truth has not had much impact”
(Jaskiewicz et al., 2017: 309). Theory surrounding
the influence of executive experiences on strategic
decisions has largely assumed that work-related experiences are of primary importance (Finkelstein,
Hambrick, & Cannella, 2009). Considering that the
family has been described as the “most important
and enduring of all human social groupings” (Smith,
2009: 5), there is reason to believe that this limited
focus may be problematic. This is especially true
given that evolutionary theory logic suggests that
early-life family experiences, which birth order
captures, shape an individual’s tendency to engage
in behaviors in childhood that persist throughout life

The importance of an individual’s birth order, or
the “relative rank of a child in terms of the age hierarchy among siblings in the family,” has been of
great interest to the public and researchers alike
(Steelman, 1985: 354–355). Birth order, which captures early-life experiences within the family domain, has been described as one of, if not the most,
fundamental, engrained, and generalizable determinants of individual behavior (Jaskiewicz, Combs,
Shanine, & Kacmar, 2017; Sulloway, 1996). Bestselling parenting books and popular press articles
have detailed the influence birth order has on children’s development and adult behavior (Isaacson &
We would like to thank the associate editor, Sucheta
Nadkarni, and three anonymous reviewers for their guidance and feedback throughout the review process. We
would also like to thank John Busenbark for comments on
an earlier version of this paper, as well as Bruce “Buck”
Leffingwell for his help in the data collection effort.
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and, as we theorize, into the executive suite (Suitor &
Pillemer, 2007; Sulloway, 1996).
We thus attempt to shift the CEO experiences literature to the family domain by developing theory
to explain how CEO birth order influences CEOs’
strategic decisions, specifically strategic risk taking.
Evolutionary theory (Darwin, 1968) suggests that
humans adapt to their environment over time to
survive. One birth order–related adaptation is sibling rivalry (Buss, 2007; Sulloway, 1996). Humans
developed the tendency to engage in sibling rivalry
since historically many children did not survive
to adulthood (Buss, 2007). By engaging in sibling
rivalry siblings compete for parental investment,
which may lead to resource allocation differences
that historically increased the likelihood of survival
(Buss, 2007; Sulloway, 1996).
When engaging in sibling rivalry, siblings use
different behaviors to increase their parents’ investment in their welfare; birth order drives these
behavior choices. Specifically, siblings use different behaviors so that they fulfill “niches” within
the family to garner additional parental resources
(Plomin & Daniels, 1987; Wang, Kruger, & Wilke,
2009). Evolutionary theory suggests that birth order
is a powerful determinant of the behaviors siblings
use in this rivalry (Steelman, 1985; Sulloway, 1996).
Indeed, birth order “causes siblings to experience
family relationships in dissimilar ways and to pursue different ways of maximizing their parent’s
investment” (Sulloway, 2001: 40). As a result of
birth order, different behavioral tendencies become
engrained (Sulloway, 1999, 2001) and “persist into
adulthood” (Suitor & Pillemer, 2007; Sulloway &
Zweigenhaft, 2010: 414).
Building on this logic, we theorize that birth order
is positively associated with an individual’s penchant for risk taking. Evolutionary theory logic
suggests that an individual’s birth order directly relates to the tendency to engage in risky behaviors
(Sulloway & Zweigenhaft, 2010). Parents invest more
in earlier-born children and these individuals have a
greater tendency to “not take unnecessary chances
[or risks]” (Grable & Joo, 2004: 81). In contrast, laterborn children tend to receive less parental investment and resources (Hertwig, Davis, & Sulloway,
2002). Evolutionary theory thus suggests that younger siblings are more likely to engage in risky behaviors to try to “recalibrate parental investment in
their favor” (Sulloway & Zweigenhaft, 2010: 414). As
scholars suggest that one’s birth order influences
their risk-taking propensity, we theorize that this
tendency to engage in risky behaviors carries over
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into the executive suite, such that the later a CEO’s
birth order, the more strategic risk they will take.
We also examine the boundaries of CEO birth order by developing theory regarding moderators. As
moderators can provide evidence for a theorized
mechanism (Baron & Kenny, 1986; Shi, Zhang, &
Hoskisson, 2017)—in our case, sibling rivalry—we
theorize about moderators that scholars have suggested tap into sibling rivalry (e.g., McNerney &
Usner, 2001; Stocker, Lanthier, & Furman, 1997).
Specifically, we theorize that the extent to which
sibling rivalry was present in childhood, as indicated
by the age gap between a CEO and the closest sibling,
will impact the extent to which birth order effects
were engrained—amplifying the main effect. We
suggest that the extent to which childhood sibling
rivalry is recalled, which we assess using CEO age,
will impact the main effect. Finally, we theorize that
the extent to which sibling rivalry is ongoing, as indicated by having a sibling CEO, will amplify the
main effect.
We test our theory in the context of familycontrolled business groups in South Korea, which
are collections of legally independent firms operating across multiple industries bonded together by
formal (e.g., equity) and informal (e.g., family) ties
(Khanna & Yafeh, 2007). This organizational form
comprises a significant portion of family firms,
which is the most common type of business in the
world (La Porta, López de Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999;
Villalonga & Amit, 2010). Indeed, business groups
are a prevalent organizational form across much of
Asia, Europe Latin America, and the Middle East (see
Table 1), allowing our findings to generalize to a large
portion of global businesses (Colpan, Hikino, & Lincoln,
2010). To enhance generalizability, we also include
quotes from two U.S. sibling CEOs we interviewed
and, in a supplemental analysis, find support for
our theory in a small sample of U.S. public firm
CEOs.
Our study makes four main contributions. First,
we shift the theoretical conversation around executive experiences toward the family domain and an
important construct that captures early-life family
domain experiences—birth order. In focusing on
birth order, we also introduce a characteristic that
captures early-life experiences that may shape executives’ strategic decisions. In fact, to better understand birth order’s generalizability, we searched
for and found studies demonstrating birth order
differences in the 15 largest world economies (see
Table 2). Thus, unlike some CEO characteristics that
may occur and be interpreted differently across
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TABLE 1
Family Business Group Representation Around the
World
Country

Family
Group %

Family Group
Market Cap %

Country
GDP Rank

Argentina
Belgium
Brazil
Canada
Chile
Colombia
Demark
France
Greece
Hong Kong
India
Indonesia
Israel
Italy
Malaysia
Mexico
Pakistan
Peru
Philippines
Portugal
Singapore
Sri Lanka
Sweden
Thailand
Turkey

19.48
24.39
20.91
5.16
46.19
48.21
9.73
11.19
20.00
15.63
29.31
29.70
40.09
19.24
17.03
26.24
22.87
21.53
45.95
23.08
10.69
66.67
20.41
21.72
50.00

11.03
28.50
15.31
13.15
44.52
52.13
20.06
9.20
19.06
26.29
22.63
53.07
23.22
26.34
38.51
49.47
9.89
43.09
30.23
9.94
41.11
43.88
25.66
47.06
46.43

21
24
8
10
41
39
35
7
51
33
6
16
31
9
37
15
40
49
38
46
36
64
22
25
17

Notes: These data were sourced from Masulis, Pham, and Zein
(2011). Family group % refers to the percentage of all listed firms in
a country that belong to a business group. Family group market cap
% refers to the proportion of aggregate market capitalization attributable to business groups. Country GDP rank data were taken
from WorldBank (2017b).

cultures (Foster, Campbell, & Twenge, 2003;
Hofstede & McCrae, 2004),1 birth order seems to
generalize and generate similar effects worldwide.
Second, drawing on evolutionary theory, we respond to calls to leverage “family science” theories
in management, given the enduring importance of
family. Our theory and findings have broad implications, as a CEO’s birth order should impact risk
taking across organizational forms. Indeed, our primary and supplementary analyses provide evidence
that birth order impacts the strategic risk taking
of CEOs in business groups and public firms. Our
1

For instance, a culture’s individualism influences the
likelihood, as well as the interpretation, of narcissism (e.g.,
Foster, Campbell, & Twenge, 2003). Further, Hofstede
and McCrae (2004) found that the prevalence of various
personality traits is endogenous to certain cultural
dimensions.
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moderated finding regarding sibling CEOs, however,
is of particular importance for family firms and
business groups, where siblings are more often CEOs
of separate public firms (Carney, 2008).
Third, we develop theory around birth order moderators. While scholars have suggested that birth order
effects are contingent, birth order research has been
criticized for its “failure to assess the role of relevant
moderator variables” (Sulloway & Zweigenhaft, 2010:
413). We address this by theorizing and finding that
birth order effects are amplified when sibling rivalry during childhood may have been intense and
when ongoing sibling rivalry is present, which we
suggest age gap with siblings and presence of a
sibling CEO captures, respectively. Finally, we advance understanding of strategic risk taking, which
is a core strategic decision and the focus of much
corporate governance research (e.g., Eisenhardt,
1989; Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998).
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Upper Echelons Theory
Research on CEO experiences has primarily drawn
on upper echelons theory (Hambrick & Mason,
1984). Utilizing the concept of bounded rationality
(Cyert & March, 1963), “the idea that informationally
complex, uncertain situations are not objectively
knowable, but rather are merely interpretable”
(Hambrick, 2007: 334), this theory suggests that executives filter and interpret situations facing their
firms based on their characteristics (Hambrick &
Mason, 1984). As such, upper echelons theory assumes that executive characteristics are related to
strategic decisions.
Building on this theory, CEO characteristics
research has largely developed along two lines
(Finkelstein et al., 2009). First, scholars have examined the relation between psychological properties
and strategic decisions. These studies have focused
on executive personality captured through the Big
Five dimensions (Herrmann & Nadkarni, 2014;
Nadkarni & Herrmann, 2010), as well as other personality constructs, such as narcissism, hubris, and
overconfidence (e.g., Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007;
Chen, Crossland, & Luo, 2015). More recent work in
this area has focused on CEOs’ values, such as political ideology (e.g., Christensen, Dhaliwal, Boivie,
& Graffin, 2015), and cognitive aspects, such as
temporal disposition (e.g., Chen & Nadkarni, 2017).
The second line of research, and our focus, theorizes about the influence of experiences on strategic
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TABLE 2
Studies Examining Birth Order’s Global Influence
Author(s) and Year

Country

Country
Rank (GDP)

Gilliam and Chatterjee (2011)
Xu and Zheng (2014)
Kusunoki et al. (2012)
Härkönen (2013)
Green and Griffiths (2014)
Adli, Louichi, and Tamouh (2010)

United States
China
Japan
Germany
United Kingdom
France

1
2
3
4
5
6

Jayachandran and Pande (2017)

India

7

Bacci, Bartolucci, Chiavarini,
Minelli, and Pieroni (2014)
Emerson and Souza (2008)
Davis (1997)
Juon et al. (1995)
Rohde et al. (2003)a
Milne and Judge (2009)
Bertoni and Brunello (2016)a
Lafortune and Lee (2014)a

Italy

8

a

Brazil
Canada
South Korea
Russia
Australia
Spain
Mexico

9
10
11
12
13
14
15

Findings
Later-borns more willing to make risky investments
Later-borns more likely to have homosexual orientation
Later-borns have less risk of food allergies
Birth order has a negative effect on educational attainment
Later-borns have greater risk of post traumatic stress disorder
Positive relationship between birth order and educational
achievement
Positive relationship between birth order and height
disadvantage
Positive relationship between birth order and birth weight
Positive relationship between birth order and school attendance
Negative relationship between birth order and status orientation
Later-borns more likely to smoke than earlier-born boys
Last-born child more likely to be the parents’ favorite
Later-borns have first sexual experience at younger age
Later-borns switch jobs earlier and more frequently
Birth order negatively related to years of education

Study contained samples from multiple countries. Country rank based on WorldBank (2017b).

decisions. These studies have generally focused
on work-related experiences captured by job
tenure; exposure to different functional areas,
industries, or countries; and formal education
(Finkelstein et al., 2009). Executive tenure has
largely been related to cognitive inertia (e.g.,
Luo, Kanuri, & Andrews, 2014), whereas functional background research has centered on
the idea that it provides a lens through which
executives interpret business problems (e.g.,
Crossland, Zyung, Hiller, & Hambrick, 2014).
Similarly, research on managers’ international
experience (e.g., Daily, Certo, & Dalton, 2000) and
on formal education has focused on how such
experiences impact executives’ information filtering and ultimately their decisions.
While research on executive experiences has
enhanced our understanding of CEOs’ strategic
decisions, family science research, in particular
evolutionary theory logic on birth order, has suggested that the limited focus on CEOs’ work-related
experiences may be problematic. Indeed, the family has been described as the “most important and
enduring of all human social groupings” (Smith,
2009: 5); thus, these experiences may have important implications—even for CEOs. In particular, we
suggest that family domain experiences may influence how CEOs perceive and react to their
environment.

Birth order captures fundamental early-life family
experiences that come with growing up under the
care of parents along with siblings (Jaskiewicz et al.,
2017; Sulloway, 1996). In addition, scholars have
suggested that birth order might impact CEOs’ strategic
decisions (Jaskiewicz et al., 2017). We thus advance
theory on executive experiences by developing new
theory surrounding the family and birth order—a topic
to which we now turn.
Birth Order and Evolutionary Theory
Birth order research has a storied history. Most
trace its roots to Sir Francis Galton, who noticed that
first-borns were overrepresented among renowned
English scientists (Galton, 1874). This insight caught
the attention of two prominent psychologists,
Sigmund Freud and Alfred Adler, who developed
competing birth order perspectives. Freud’s birth
order research centered on psychoanalysis and sexual desires (Daly & Wilson, 1990), while Adler linked
birth order with neuroses, with first-born and lastborn children being more likely to develop neuroses
(Adler, 1928). As a first-born child, Freud took offense to Adler’s theory, and so, birth order became a
cause of “one of the most heated scientific disputes of
all time” (Damian & Roberts, 2015: 96).
Birth order research remains a popular topic;
scholarly explanations, however, have shifted to an
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evolutionary theory perspective, which is based on
the concept of evolution—change over time in living
structures among species (Buss, 2007). Darwin
(1968) is credited with introducing evolutionary
theory, but other scholars set the stage for his research. Lamarck (1809) noted that species change,
suggesting that giraffes developed long necks to
reach high leaves. Further, early evolutionists suggested that many animals had adaptations; for example, turtles have protective shells and porcupines
have quills to fend off predators (Buss, 2007).
Missing from early research, however, was an explanation of how these adaptations develop. Drawing on Malthus (1798) regarding the principles of
population, Darwin (1968) provided an answer.
Darwin (1968: 13) recognized that, “More [organisms] are produced than can possibly survive,” and
so, “there, must [. . .] be a struggle for existence;” he
thus introduced the concept of natural selection, a
process whereby organisms adapt and change over
time to increase their ability to survive in the environment. Building on Darwin (1968), scholars have
investigated a number of adaptations, or “inherited
or reliably developing characteristic[s] that came
into existence through natural selection” to help
with an adaptive problem for an organism’s ancestors (Buss, 2007: 39; see also Tooby & Cosmides,
1992).
An adaptation related to birth order is sibling rivalry, which is driven by conflict between siblings
over parental investment (Hamilton, 1964; Trivers,
1974). Indeed, as Buckley (2005: 295) noted, “family
life is filled with frequently gory and often fatal
struggles between offspring.” Added parental investment results in resource allocation differences
that may increase a child’s likelihood of survival
(Sulloway, 1996). Thus, because “children cannot
survive without parental help” (Buss, 2007: 68),
sibling rivalry deals with the survival problem.
Research has noted the prevalence of sibling rivalry across species. In some species, siblings increase their suckling to drain their mother’s milk to
the detriment of their siblings, and some bird species
siblings jockey for food (Buss, 2007; Royle, Hartley,
Owens, & Parker, 1999). The most extreme form of
rivalry is infanticide, whereby an organism kills its
kin. Indeed, “infanticide, long considered a rare and
aberrant phenomenon, has turned out to be widespread among insects, fish, birds, and mammals”
(Sulloway, 1996: 61). Sand sharks, for example, often
devour one another while in the mother’s womb
until only one shark is left alive (Sulloway, 1996).
Further, among some bird species it is common for
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siblings to try and exclude siblings from the nest, or
even poke each other to death (Buss, 2007; Sulloway,
1996).
Human sibling rivalry, while typically less
extreme, is still consequential. Historically, many
children did not survive to adulthood. As Buss
(2007: 62) noted, “Our ancestors. . .did not have it so
easy. Many obstacles lay between waking up hungry
and dozing off at night with a full belly.” Humans
thus engage in sibling rivalry to compete for parental
investment because differences in parental investment and resources, such as food, historically
increased a child’s likelihood of survival (Sulloway,
1996).
Birth Order and Sibling Rivalry
The primary driver of sibling rivalry is birth order
(Sulloway, 1996). Birth order is thought to be a
powerful determinant of behaviors siblings use in
this rivalry (Steelman, 1985: 354–355). Due to differences driven by birth order, research has suggested that siblings develop tendencies to use
specific behaviors to fill niches within the family,
which may help them gain parental attention and
resources (Sulloway, 1996). Indeed, birth order
“causes siblings to experience family relationships
in dissimilar ways and to pursue different ways of
maximizing their parent’s investment” (Sulloway,
2001: 40). Evolutionary theory research has thus
concluded that birth order fundamentally shapes
how individuals tend to behave, and is thus “one of
the ultimate causes of [. . .] development” (Sulloway,
2001: 40) regardless of an individual’s gender (e.g.,
Argys, Rees, Averett, & Witoonchart, 2006; Badger &
Reddy, 2009).
This tendency to utilize certain behaviors associated with birth order “foster[s] individual differences in terms of how individuals can be expected to
behave” (Wang et al., 2009: 79). Different tendencies
to use specific behaviors are thus “developed in
childhood, as part of niche differentiation, including
differences arising from disparities in parental investment” (Sulloway & Zweigenhaft, 2010: 413).
Research has also suggested that these behavioral
differences “persist into adulthood” (Sulloway &
Zweigenhaft, 2010: 414), including for samples with
individuals in their 60s and even their 90s (Jefferson,
Herbst, & McCrae, 1998; Suitor & Pillemer, 2007).
Further, “the underlying psychological mechanisms [. . .] are not culture specific” (Denny, 2004:
13), and these effects seem to generalize across
countries and cultures. Scholars have found support
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for birth order differences in a diverse set of countries, such as Australia (Davis, 1997), Brazil (Milne &
Judge, 2009), China (Xu & Zheng, 2014), India
(Emerson & Souza, 2008), and South Korea (Juon
et al., 1995). Consistent with this idea, we found research showing birth order effects in each of the top
15 global economies (see Table 2).
Building on this logic surrounding birth order,
scholarly research traditionally focused on developing theory and empirically testing its association with the Big Five personality traits, and
subsequent behaviors these traits influence
(Sulloway, 1995). A growing body of research,
however, has also suggested that birth order influences an individual’s risk-taking propensity, an
important and stable aspect of personality outside
of the Big Five2 (Frey, Pedroni, Mata, Rieskamp, &
Hertwig, 2017; Nicholson, Soane, Fenton‐O’Creevy,
& Willman, 2005) that indicates an individual’s
tendency to engage in risk across contexts. For example, birth order has been shown to be positively
associated with risky behaviors, such as risky adolescent behaviors (Argys et al., 2006), participation
in risky sports (Nisbett, 1968), and risky financial
decisions (Gilliam & Chatterjee, 2011). Meta-analytic
evidence, albeit in the sports context, has suggested
that birth order’s relationship with risk-taking propensity may even be stronger than its relationship
with other personality aspects, such as the Big Five
(Sulloway & Zweigenhaft, 2010)
CEO BIRTH ORDER AND STRATEGIC
RISK TAKING
Risk taking is a core CEO decision; thus, the notion
that birth order may be related to risk taking is consequential for scholars and practitioners. Indeed,
above and beyond being a core decision, numerous
corporate governance mechanisms, such as executive compensation and board of directors composition, are intended to influence CEOs’ strategic risk
taking (e.g., Eisenhardt, 1989; Wiseman & GomezMejia, 1998). We thus develop theory about CEO
birth order and its relationship with strategic risk
taking.
We theorize that CEO birth order relates to strategic risk taking because birth order influences the
2
While research has indicated that risk propensity is a
personality trait outside the Big Five, research has also
indicated that sublevel aspects of the Big Five, such as
sensation seeking, are facets of risk propensity (e.g.,
Nicholson et al., 2005).
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extent to which individuals may engage in risky behaviors to deal with sibling rivalry and foster their
niche within the family to gain parental attention
and resources. This tendency to engage in risky behaviors in childhood should become engrained and,
as previous studies have found, become a key driver
of an individual’s risk propensity, which “persist[s]
into adulthood,” influencing subsequent behaviors
(Sulloway & Zweigenhaft, 2010: 414).
In considering what behaviors siblings use to deal
with sibling rivalry and gain parental favor, we theorize that the earlier a sibling is in the birth order, the
less they will attempt to garner parental investment
and thus the lower their tendency to engage in risky
behaviors to carve out a niche. Scholars have noted
that earlier-born children tend to be endowed with
greater parental resources (Hertwig et al., 2002). This
is partly because older siblings “tend to be larger,
stronger, and more intellectually developed” than
their younger siblings (Freese, Powell, & Steelman,
1999: 211). As a result, earlier-born children tend to
get their own way, which grants them easier access
to resources (Beck, Burnet, & Vosper, 2006; Hotz &
Pantano, 2015). Because earlier-born children are
endowed with greater resources, there is less need
for them to try to gain favor by engaging in risky behaviors. They are thus expected to have a lower risktaking propensity. As Grable and Joo (2004: 81)
noted, parents invest more in earlier-born children
so they tend to act more responsibly and do “not take
unnecessary chances [or risks].”
Later-born siblings, in contrast, tend to receive less
parental investment and resources (Hertwig et al.,
2002), and thus, we theorize, will take greater risks
to establish a niche to gain attention and material
support. Scholars have noted that, “In a Darwinian
world,” risk taking is “adaptive wherever the chances of survival or reproduction are limited”
(Sulloway & Zweigenhaft, 2010: 414). This makes
sense, given that the costs of risk taking are reduced
when life expectancy is lower (Daly & Wilson, 1990;
Wang et al., 2009). Relative to older siblings, younger
siblings historically faced lower life expectancies.
Puffer and Serrano (1973), for example, found that
fifth-borns have “2 to 3 times the mortality rates of
firstborns in many Latin American countries” (as
cited in Sulloway & Zweigenhaft, 2010: 403). Similar
mortality rates have been found in other developed
countries (Hertwig et al., 2002).
Evolutionary theory perspective on birth order
thus suggests that the later a sibling is in the birth
order, the greater their tendency to engage in risky
behaviors to try to convince parents to “recalibrate
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parental investment in their favor or, failing that, as a
way of compensating for reduced parental investment” (Sulloway & Zweigenhaft, 2010: 414).
Specifically, Bertoni and Brunello (2016: 265) suggested that “later-borns are put under greater pressure to obtain the same returns from more limited
resources and thus need to take riskier moves.”
Research across varying contexts and samples has
illustrated the positive relationship between birth
order and risk taking. Indeed, research has noted that
a striking finding from birth order research is that
siblings differ in “risk preferences as much as
strangers” (Wang et al., 2009: 79). Argys et al. (2006),
for example, found that birth order is positively associated with risky adolescent behaviors—stealing,
carrying a gun, and using marijuana. Similarly, Juon
et al. (1995) found that later-born South Korean high
school students are more likely to smoke, while
Jobe, Holgate, and Scrapansky (1983), in a sample of
U.S. military males, found that later-borns are more
likely to volunteer for a risky experiment.
Researchers have also explored how birth order
influences risky sports outcomes. A number of
studies (e.g., Nisbett, 1968) have found that birth
order is positively related to playing risky sports (e.g.,
football and rugby). Meta-analytically, Sulloway and
Zweigenhaft (2010) found that younger-born siblings
are 1.5 times more likely to participate in risky sports.
Scholars have also found that birth order is related to
risky behaviors when playing a sport. Alberts and
Landers (1977), for example, found that later-borns are
more likely to take the risk to jump from a height of 1.8
meters. In a sample of Major League Baseball (MLB)
players, Sulloway and Zweigenhaft (2010) found that
younger siblings are 10.6 times more likely than older
siblings to attempt the high-risk activity of basestealing.
Scholars have also examined the relationship between birth order and risk taking in the business
context. Gilliam and Chatterjee (2011), for example,
surveyed students and found that later-borns were
more willing to make risky investments. Morgan
(2009) examined financial investments decisions,
and found that later-borns tend to take greater financial risks and are more willing to gamble for a
higher payoff. Further, Bertoni and Brunello (2016)
found that later-borns switch jobs earlier and more
frequently due to their tendency to engage in risky
behaviors.
If individuals engage in behaviors suggested by
their birth order, and sibling differences in risktaking propensity do persist into adulthood (Sulloway
& Zweigenhaft, 2010), then a CEO’s birth order should
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be associated with the strategic risk CEOs take in the
executive suite. Indeed, CEOs often make strategic
decisions that involve risk—i.e., decisions that are
highly uncertain and have a potential for negative
returns—thus, CEO birth order should play a role such
that the later a CEO’s birth order, the more strategic risk
they should take. In support of this notion, we interviewed two U.S. sibling CEOs who each led firms with
over $1 billion in annual sales, and the later-born sibling noted that he is “more of a risk taker.” We thus
theorize:
Hypothesis 1. CEO birth order is positively associated
with strategic risk taking; that is, later-born CEOs will
take more risk than earlier-born CEOs.

MODERATING EFFECTS OF SIBLING RIVALRY
While we theorize a direct effect of CEO birth
order on strategic risk taking, scholars have suggested that birth order may be influenced by moderators (e.g., Sulloway, 1999). However, birth order
research has been criticized for its “failure to assess
the role of relevant moderator variables” (Sulloway &
Zweigenhaft, 2010: 413). We thus develop new theory about moderators of CEO birth order and strategic risk taking. As evolutionary theory proposes that
birth order effects are driven by sibling rivalry
(Sulloway, 1996), we theorize that the extent to
which sibling rivalry was present during childhood,
the extent to which childhood sibling rivalry is
recalled, and the extent to which sibling rivalry is
ongoing will moderate the relationship between CEO
birth order and strategic risk taking. Developing
theory about moderators that capture facets of sibling
rivalry allows us to provide further evidence for the
theorized mechanism suggested in our first hypothesis, and also provides better understanding of the
boundary conditions of CEO birth order (Baron &
Kenny, 1986; Shi et al., 2017).3
Sibling Rivalry During Childhood
As birth order effects develop during childhood
(Sulloway, 1996), it follows that the extent to which
sibling rivalry was present during this period should
Baron and Kenny (1986: 1178) noted that there is “wide
variation in the strategic functions served by moderators.”
They state, “a moderator has been useful in suggesting a
mediator variable.” Thus, our moderators that attempt to
tap sibling rivalry help provide evidence that this mechanism is driving our results.
3
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influence the degree to which the behavioral tendencies become engrained and influence an individual’s risk-taking propensity (Kidwell, 1981).
That is, sibling rivalry is the key mechanism behind
birth order effects—these effects exist because siblings, in vying for a favorable niche within the family,
compete differently based on the order in which they
are born. If there is greater jockeying for parental
attention and resources during childhood, nichedifferentiation behaviors based on birth order should
be more engrained. Accordingly, we theorize that the
effect of CEO birth order on strategic risk taking will
be amplified under conditions of greater childhood
sibling rivalry. On the other hand, if an individual’s
childhood featured little sibling rivalry, birth
order–based niche differentiation among siblings
should have been less salient, and, we theorize, the
relationship between CEO birth order and strategic
risk taking should thus be weakened.
We theorize that closest sibling age gap, or the
number of years in age between an individual and his
or her closest sibling (Freese et al., 1999), captures
the extent of childhood sibling rivalry. Research has
suggested that age gap influences the extent to which
siblings need to compete with one another during
childhood and thus use behaviors to fulfill niches in
pursuit of parental attention (Sulloway, 2001). When
the age gap between siblings is small, siblings are
more likely to have to compete for scarce resources
and parental attention (Stocker et al., 1997). Indeed,
Badger and Reddy (2009: 47) stated that “the closer
in age two [. . .] siblings are, the more likely it is that
there will be competition between them,” and
Stocker et al. (1997) specifically found that age gap is
negatively correlated with conflict between siblings.
This is logical, as small sibling age gaps were traditionally associated with higher infant mortality
(Sulloway, 1996). The greater competition between
siblings closer in age thus likely promotes mutual
“differentiation as a way of avoiding direct conflicts”
(Healey & Ellis, 2007: 56)—a condition that amplifies
birth order–based differences among siblings.
Siblings further apart in age should have less of a
need to compete for parental resources, however, as
“constraints on the time that parents can spend with
their children will [. . .] be less severe if the births of
children are spread out over a longer time period”
(De Haan, 2010: 583), and thus it should be easier for
parents to meet children’s needs if they are widely
spaced (Lasko, 1954). Further, “Greater birth spacing
between siblings helps to reduce sibling rivalry:
there is less resource competition, and it is more
likely that the elder sibling will support the younger
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sibling” (Badger & Reddy, 2009: 47). Research on
birth order has thus suggested that as the age gap
between siblings becomes larger, siblings feel less
of a need to compete for the attention of parents,
which mutes the influence of birth order (Sulloway,
1999).
In sum, smaller age gaps with siblings intensifies
sibling rivalry during childhood, as well as the salience of niche differentiation behaviors among siblings. As there is more competition among siblings
with small age gaps, later-borns in particular should
be more likely to develop the tendency to engage in
risky behaviors to create their own niche and compete for parental attention when they also have a
small age gap with their siblings. This suggests that
the effect of CEO birth order on strategic risk taking
will be stronger when the gap between siblings is
smaller, and weaker when the gap is larger. We thus
theorize:
Hypothesis 2. The positive relationship between CEO
birth order and strategic risk taking is moderated by
the age gap between a CEO and the closest-born sibling, such that the relationship is strengthened when
the age gap is smaller and weakened when the age gap
is larger.

Recall of Sibling Rivalry
The extent to which childhood sibling rivalry is
recalled, we theorize, also influences the relationship between CEO birth order and strategic risk taking. Indeed, the birth order literature has suggested
that individuals are most likely to adhere to the behaviors associated with their birth order when they
recall “patterns of behavior learned within the family,” namely the sibling rivalry experienced during
childhood (Sulloway, 2007: 176).
A factor that may predict the extent to which sibling rivalry is recalled is age. Research has suggested
that age directly influences CEOs’ strategic risking.
In fact, scholars have suggested that due to emotional aspects, such as the desire to protect their
wealth, CEO risk taking diminishes with age (e.g.,
Prendergast & Stole, 1996; Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia,
1998). Scholars have found conflicting results
with respect to this relationship (e.g., Buchholtz &
Ribbens, 1994; Serfling, 2014). Researchers have
found a positive relationship between age and CEO
risk taking (e.g., Hitt & Tyler, 1991; Li & Tang, 2010)
and no effect of age on risk taking (e.g., Chatterjee &
Hambrick, 2011; Kish-Gephart & Campbell, 2015).
Results of a meta-analysis, however, suggested that
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CEO age generally has a negative effect on risk taking
(Wang, Holmes, Oh, & Zhu, 2016).
While we recognize that research has suggested
there may be a direct effect of CEO age on strategic
risk taking, we theorize instead that CEO age moderates the direct effect of birth order on risk taking.
Though many birth order studies have focused on
younger samples, scholars have argued that because
birth order effects become engrained, these effects
persist throughout their lives. Consistent with this
idea, research has suggested that even among
mothers over 65 years old, birth order differences
persisted in terms of which child they would trust in
a crisis and the child with whom they felt the closest
emotional attachment (Suitor & Pillemer, 2007).
Similarly, in a sample of individuals aged 59–94,
much like in younger populations, later-borns
scored higher on openness to experience and agreeableness (Jefferson et al., 1998).
While scholars have suggested that birth order
differences endure throughout life, research has also
suggested that these effects weaken over time. That
is, age impacts the recall of sibling rivalry as well as
the emotional intensity associated with the recall,
and thus attenuates the relationship between birth
order and risk taking. The competition for parental
investment is “at its peak during childhood and adolescence” (Damian & Roberts, 2015: 97) because
children are dependent on their parents for resources
and thus are most likely to engage in sibling rivalry
and use risky behaviors to differentiate themselves
from siblings and carve out their niche (Sulloway &
Zweigenhaft, 2010). In support of this notion,
McNerney and Usner (2001) found that sibling rivalry peaked between the ages of 10–15 and reduced
as people aged, and Scharf, Shulman, and AvigadSpitz (2005) noted that conflict and rivalry were also
reported by emerging adults to be less intense than by
adolescents.
Further, individuals tend to be more independent
and less reliant on parental resources as they age
(Harris, 2000), and they may be less inclined to recall
the sibling rivalry and utilize the risky behaviors
suggested by their birth order. Indeed, because behaviors that were “once relevant for survival in the
family context in early years may no longer be relevant once the child leaves the family environment”
(Damian & Roberts, 2015: 97), there is likely to be less
emotional intensity associated with the recall of
childhood sibling rivalry. Scholars have suggested
that as people age they have a greater tendency to
seek out individuals with whom they share the longest history—their siblings—to engage in life review
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(Goetting, 1986). This is a final chance to resolve
rivalries and emotional baggage from childhood
(White, 2001). Older siblings tend to lay to rest unresolved childhood rivalries (Goetting, 1986), and
“people’s memories become rosier with time and
distance from childhood conflicts, and thus they let
go of jealousy and competition” (Greif & Woolley,
2016: 70). We therefore expect that the influence of
birth order on risk taking is reduced with age due to
the cognitive and emotional aspects related to the
recall of childhood sibling rivalry.
Consistent with this idea, research has suggested
that while birth order effects persist later in life, the
effects weaken over time (e.g., Suitor & Pillemer,
2007). Indeed, Cicirelli (1982: 278) concluded that
“the weight of evidence from most sources indicates
a lessening of rivalry with age.” Specifically, based
on a sample of individuals ranging in age from 59–94,
Jefferson et al. (1998) found that the effects of birth
order were weaker than observed in studies with
younger samples. Similarly, in their meta-analysis of
risk taking in sports, Sulloway and Zweigenhaft
(2010) found that studies of children had larger effects than those of adults and adolescents. Further,
Myers and Goodboy (2006) found that the perceived
use of verbally aggressive messages between siblings, a potential indicator of sibling rivalry, decreases across the lifespan.
We thus suggest that as CEOs age, they may be less
likely to recall the sibling rivalry and associated risky
behaviors utilized in their childhood, and that the
emotional intensity of recalled sibling rivalry will be
weaker. While we accept the imprinting effects of
birth order reported in prior studies, we suggest that
the potency of these effects diminishes as CEOs age,
such that the relationship is stronger for younger
CEOs and weaker for older CEOs. More formally:
Hypothesis 3. The positive relationship between CEO
birth order and strategic risk taking is moderated by
CEO age, such that the relationship is strengthened
when CEOs are younger in age and weakened when
CEOs are older in age.

Ongoing Sibling Rivalry
While the tendency to use risky behaviors associated with birth order develops during childhood, we
theorize that the underlying mechanism of sibling
rivalry may be amplified in situations in adulthood
that facilitate ongoing sibling competition. Scholars
have suggested that birth order effects are dependent
on “whether or not certain attitudes and sentiments
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about the family”—specifically sibling rivalry—“are
tapped in ways that make them salient” (Sulloway,
2007: 162). Indeed, Sulloway and Zweigenhaft
(2010) suggested that birth order differences may
be more context sensitive than previously believed.
Building on this logic, we theorize that the intensity
of an ongoing rivalry with siblings amplifies the relationship between birth order and risk taking.
A factor that may be indicative of an individual’s
ongoing sibling rivalry in adulthood is whether they
have a sibling in the same career and position. Sibling
rivalry can become salient in adulthood when siblings
have the same job because “habits of mutual monitoring and social comparison formed in the course of
competition for parental recognition during the early
childhood period” can “influence adult sibling relationships and rivalry” (Ko & Park, 2017: 3). This is
especially relevant as it relates to siblings having the
same career and position. Scholars have noted that
“achievement is the dimension of rivalry par excellence,” and that adulthood achievement takes the form
of professional success (Ross & Milgram, 1982: 238). In
terms of having the same career and position, Bexley
(2017: 1) noted, “when you choose to take the same
career path as your sibling, you are almost asking for
comparisons to be made all through your life. There’s
no doubt that [. . .] will make you more competitive.”
Sulloway and Zweigenhaft (2010) similarly suggested
that adult behaviors continue to be sensitive to sibling
rivalry when two siblings are in the same career and
position.
Research across contexts has supported the idea
that sibling rivalry intensifies when siblings have the
same career and position. McNerney and Usner (2001),
for example, found that sibling rivalry peaked when
siblings were each focused on similar tasks. Further, in
a study of MLB players, having a sibling who also
played professional baseball amplified sibling rivalry
(Sulloway & Zweigenhaft, 2010). Specifically, playing
in a similar athletic position tended to increase competition among siblings (Sulloway & Zweigenhaft,
2010). Justin Upton, a player in MLB whose sibling,
Melvin, is a professional baseball player who plays the
same position, said, “having an older brother to try to
catch up to just added a little more fire under my butt.
That’s what drove me” (Jones, 2007)—we theorize
similar effects for CEOs.
For a CEO, having a sibling who also works as a CEO
should promote greater sibling rivalry and thus amplify birth order’s relationship with risk taking. Research has found rivalry between siblings in the
business context. For example, Levinson (1971: 382)
described the influence of sibling rivalry in firms,

1287

stating that, “the rivalry [. . .] which began in childhood, continues into adult life” and “can reach such an
intensity that it colors every management decision.” A
few studies on family businesses, where having a sibling who is also a CEO is somewhat common,4 have
also corroborated this idea. Research, for example, has
suggested that sibling relationships drive rivalry as
sibling managers compete for power and status in
family firms’ leadership (Kaye, 1991; Sorenson, 1999).
More relevant to our theorizing, Ko and Park (2017: 1)
suggested an “intense rivalry between sibling CEOs,”
that influences CEOs’ strategic actions. In further support of our theorizing, one of the two aforementioned
sibling CEOs we interviewed noted that he and his
brother were “competitors in most activities that we
both did,” and that his brother “was in big business and
made a lot more money than I. . .so, possibly there was
competition there.”
Given the heightened sibling rivalry experienced
when a CEO has a sibling who is also a CEO, we
theorize that the relationship between CEO birth
order and strategic risk taking will be stronger compared to instances when a CEO does not have a sibling CEO. We thus theorize:
Hypothesis 4. The positive relationship between CEO
birth order and strategic risk taking is moderated by
the presence of a sibling CEO, such that the relationship is strengthened when a CEO has a sibling who
is a CEO and weakened when a CEO does not have
a sibling who is a CEO.

METHODS
Context
We tested our theory in the context of familycontrolled business groups in South Korea known as
Chaebols,5 and specifically the publicly traded firms
4

While having a sibling CEO is common in family firms,
especially business groups, it also occurs in nonfamily
firms. Indeed, we found seven recent instances where
siblings simultaneously served as CEO of large U.S. public
firms (FBCG, 2017). For example, Denise Morrison was the
CEO of Campbell Soup and Maggie Wilderrotter (her sister)
was the CEO of Frontier Communications.
5
Chaebols are South Korean business groups that consist of multiple private or publicly traded companies,
typically owned and managed by a family dynasty. In 2015,
the largest Chaebols consisted of an average of approximately 28 affiliated companies. Some prominent examples
of Chaebols are Hyundai, Samsung, and the LG Group.
These Chaebol-affiliated companies have many similarities to U.S. public companies that are family controlled.
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within such groups. There were three main reasons for
this choice. First, family firms, and more specifically
business groups, are ubiquitous around the world.
Research has shown that the Western conception of
organizations (i.e., nonfamily firms with dispersed
shareholders), on which management research has
largely focused, is less common than believed
(Feldman, Amit, & Villalonga, 2016; Patel & Cooper,
2014). Family firms comprise the majority of publicly traded firms in the world, even in the United
States, where widely held corporations are thought
to pervade (Feldman et al., 2016; La Porta et al.,
1999; Villalonga & Amit, 2009, 2010). Indeed, research has noted that family firms make up at least
two thirds of all businesses around the world and
generate approximately 70–90% of global GDP (FFI,
2018).
A large portion of family-controlled firms are business groups, or collections of legally independent firms
operating across multiple industries bonded together
by formal (e.g., equity) and informal (e.g., family) ties
(Khanna & Yafeh, 2007). Indeed, business groups are a
prevalent organizational form across much of Asia,
Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East (Colpan
et al., 2010). In fact, as illustrated by Table 1, business
groups are common in many of the top global economies in the world, and in South Korea in particular the
top five business groups alone account for 51% of the
country’s market capitalization (Bloomberg, 2018).
Our context thus captures much of South Korea’s
economy—the 11th largest economy in the world—and
allows our findings to generalize to a substantial portion of global businesses.
Second, our setting is suitable for our proposed
theory since it allows observation of ongoing sibling
rivalry, a mechanism relevant to our theorizing
(Sulloway, 2001). In family business groups, multiple siblings tend to be involved (Carney, 2008), with
some serving as CEOs of independent firms at the
same time—a condition we argue contributes to ongoing sibling rivalry. Our context is thus well suited
for tests of CEO birth order that not only examine its
impact on strategic decisions, but also elucidate the
underlying sibling rivalry mechanism.
Finally, this context allows us to overcome significant data collection challenges. To test our hypotheses,
we required detailed family background information,
such as birth order, family size, and age and gender of
each sibling, for a large number of CEOs for whom we
could also collect matching data on strategic risk taking
and other control variables. It was infeasible to collect
this data through surveys because of generally low response rates by executives (Cycyota & Harrison, 2002)
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and the sensitive nature and amount of data we
needed. In South Korea, however, it is possible to obtain detailed personal information about the families
behind business groups because of the level of scrutiny
they are subject to by the public. In particular, media
and research organizations have traced these families’
histories across several decades and made this information publicly available through news articles and
books (Han, Shipilov, & Greve, 2017). At the same time,
however, we were able to largely replicate our results
in a small sample of United States–based CEOs, which
we discuss in our supplementary analyses.
While the use of data on South Korean business
groups enables the advantages mentioned above,
prior studies have recommended that research using
international samples should consider how the
context may influence the theories being tested
(Nadkarni & Herrmann, 2010). We acknowledge the
need for such consideration, as the ideas we drew
from to develop our theory may be impacted by our
context. Therefore, we next discuss how our context
may influence (1) the effects of birth order and (2) the
effects of CEOs on firm strategy.
Study context and the effects of birth order. A
potential concern is whether birth order–related predictions can be applied to the South Korean context. In
this regard, we note again that our arguments about
CEO birth order are rooted in evolutionary theory.
Notions of niche partitioning (Sulloway, 2001) are
universal, are not thought to be driven by unique cultural nuances, and can even be applied to the behaviors
of nonhuman species, such as sharks or birds (Buss,
2007). We thus agree with Denny’s (2004: 17) view that
as it relates to birth order, “the underlying psychological mechanisms [. . .] are not culture specific.” To examine this assertion further, we sought studies of birth
order differences in the top 15 economies in the world.
As reported in Table 2, we found studies in each of
these countries that support birth order differences
across a broad range of outcomes. This review suggests
that birth order differences are ubiquitous and not
necessarily bound by cultural or national borders.
Nevertheless, some specific aspects of the South
Korean context are worth highlighting for their potential influence on birth order differences and sibling rivalry. One aspect is the Confucian culture of
deference toward one’s elders (primarily parents, but
also older siblings) within the family (Kim, Atkinson,
& Yang, 1999; Pyke, 2005). This tendency could potentially serve to mitigate overt sibling rivalry and
reduce the likelihood of observing significant CEO
birth order effects based on sibling rivalry. Counter to
this argument, however, is the fact that in family firm

2019

Campbell, Jeong, and Graffin

settings, there is a tendency for siblings to compete
vigorously with each other, often for the rights to
succession of the company or the broader business
group (Kets de Vries, 1993; Peng & Jiang, 2010).
South Korean media also closely scrutinizes and
dedicates a great deal of attention to business groups
and the sibling rivalry occurring within family firms,
so it is also possible that this unique cultural aspect
might further intensify sibling rivalry (Han et al.,
2017). With arguments that would support the case
for both a subdued and amplified sibling rivalry effect based on contextual nuances, it is difficult to
proclaim a priori whether our context makes it more
or less likely to find significant birth order effects.
However, as we point out above, prior research has
suggested that birth order effects are not culturally
specific.
Study context and CEO effects. Another point to
consider is the extent to which CEOs in South Korea
can affect firm outcomes. It has been well established
in the upper echelons literature that managerial discretion, or the latitude of action given to executives
(Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987), varies across cultural
contexts. Crossland and Hambrick’s (2007, 2011)
framework predicts variance in CEO effects across
countries. For instance, South Korean CEOs’ discretion
may be limited as the strong cultural norms of collectivism restrict the individual initiative that CEOs can
exercise (Gelfand, Bhawuk, Nishii, & Bechtold, 2004),
and a tendency toward uncertainty avoidance also
typically restricts CEOs’ leeway (Schwartz, 1994).
Further, South Korea’s legal system inhibits CEOs’ influence over stakeholders (Johnson, La Porta, Lopezde-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2000), and the relatively low
labor flexibility reduces the latitude of action CEOs
have over their employees (Estevez-Abe, Iversen, &
Soskice, 2001). Bearing out these arguments, industry
experts and academics have rated South Korean CEOs
as having low levels of managerial discretion compared to CEOs in other countries (Crossland &
Hambrick, 2011).
Our choice of empirical context can thus be justified
on the basis of generalizability, observation of theoretical mechanisms, and data availability. This setting
also allows for a fairly conservative test of our hypotheses given South Korean CEOs’ limited discretion,
which may make it more difficult to find a relationship
between a CEO characteristic and strategic outcome.
Sample and Data Sources
For data on birth order and characteristics of CEOs’
families, we relied primarily on The Chaebol of
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Korea: The management structure and personal
network of Korean Chaebols (Kim, Kim, Paik, Jeong,
Paik, & Yoo, 2005), which details major business
families in South Korea based on extensive research,
including information on the names and birthdates of
the founders, their descendants, and their relatives.
To supplement this source and keep the family trees
up to date, we searched news articles, obituaries, and
other sources as needed. We obtained other firm- and
CEO-level data from databases of the Korea Information Service (KIS), the largest credit rating
agency in the country, and the Korea Listed Companies Association (KLCA) (e.g., Han et al., 2017; Lee &
Song, 2012; Siegel, 2007). Acquisition data were obtained from SDC platinum.
To construct our dataset, we sampled firms affiliated with the largest Chaebols as identified by the
Korea Fair Trade Commission. We then identified
cases in which members of the Chaebol families
served as CEOs of these publicly traded firms during
1999–2015. After accounting for missing data, we
arrived at a sample of 71 CEOs across 67 firms, and a
final sample size of 503 CEO-years. It is noteworthy
that all CEOs in our sample are males, but this is not
surprising given that South Korea ranks low in global
studies of gender equality (e.g., it was recently ranked
116th in the world) (World Economic Forum, 2016).
While we observe no female CEOs in our sample,
unfortunately the underrepresentation of female
CEOs is consistent with many settings across the
world, including the United States (Favaro, Karlsson,
& Neilson, 2014).
Dependent Variable: Strategic Risk Taking
Consistent with prior research, we measured strategic
risk taking by aggregating three major outlays typically
associated with uncertain and potentially negative
returns: capital expenditures, research and development (R&D) spending, and acquisitions (Chatterjee &
Hambrick, 2011; Sanders & Hambrick, 2007). Capital
expenditures and R&D spending were obtained from
the KLCA database, and acquisitions were measured as
the transaction value of all completed acquisitions as
reported in SDC platinum. We aggregated these risktaking indicators instead of treating them as separate
dependent variables because these spending categories
often substitute for each other. For example, a firm may
expand its product portfolio through an acquisition instead of through R&D investments. We formed a risktaking index by logging the sum of the three different
types of risky spending to create an aggregate indicator
(Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2011).
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Independent Variables
CEO birth order. To obtain our sample of CEOs,
we used the KISLINE database, which lists executives according to their rank within the company.
The CEO was identified as the person ranked number
1 within each company (Chang & Shin, 2006). This
treatment of the most senior executive of a business
group–affiliated firm as CEO is consistent with
prior research (Crossland & Hambrick, 2011). It is
important to note that the head of the entire business
group (i.e., the group chairman) is typically distinct
from the CEO at the publicly traded firm level.
For example, the current group chairman of the
Samsung Group is Lee Kun-hee, but the CEO of
Samsung Electronics, a publicly traded firm in
the Samsung Group, is Kwon Oh-hyun. Similar to
CEOs in other contexts, our CEOs have broad influence over the entire firm, so they are also distinct
from division heads, whose influence typically is
more limited within the organization.
The CEO birth order variable was coded as the order
in which CEOs were born to their parents. It took the
value of 1 for a first-born, 2 for a second-born, 3 for a
third-born, etc. Following prior studies (e.g., Booth &
Kee, 2009; De Haan, 2010), we treated birth order as a
continuous variable in our regression models predicting strategic risk taking. This approach allows interpretation of the linear effects of increases or
decreases in birth order and avoids the loss of information caused by forcing birth order to be a categorical or discrete variable. This approach, however,
hinges on the assumption that there is a generally linear relationship between birth order and the outcome
(strategic risk taking), and that deviations from linearity in the relationship between birth order and strategic
risk taking are not significant. We therefore conducted
Wald tests to assess this assumption statistically (Pasta,
2009). Two different ways of operationalizing birth
order were tested. The first was to treat all the observed
birth orders as different discrete categories. In our case
this lead to seven categories given that the birth orders
of CEOs in our sample ranged from first to seventh. The
second method was to treat birth order as comprising of
three categories: first-born, middle-born, and last-born.
In both cases, the test of deviation from linearity
entailed entering the continuous birth order variable
simultaneously with the categorical variables in a
generalized estimating equations (GEE) model predicting strategic risk taking (Long & Freese, 2006). The
number of dummy variables entered should be two less
than the number of categories (i.e., five dummies for
the seven-category measure of birth order and one
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dummy in the case of the three-category measure).
According to these tests, neither the seven-category
measure nor the three-category measure of birth order
was statistically significant. This led us to conclude
that the continuous treatment of birth order is preferred, as its deviations from linearity were not statistically significant (Pasta, 2009; Williams, 2016).
Closest sibling age gap. This variable was measured
as the number of years between the focal CEOs and
their closest sibling (e.g., Buckles & Munnich, 2012).
When the focal CEO was a first-born, the closest sibling
was the immediate younger sibling. In cases where an
individual had a younger and older sibling, we determined the closest sibling based on their birthdates.
Presence of sibling CEO. We measured presence
of sibling CEO as a binary indicator that takes the
value of 1 when a sibling of the focal CEO was simultaneously a CEO of another independently
traded firm (this occurred for 37% of our CEO-year
observations). This determination was made based
on the executives list provided in the KIS database.
All of the sibling CEOs in our sample are males.
CEO age. We captured CEO age by subtracting the
focal year from the CEO’s birth year.
Controls
We included several CEO-level control variables in
our models. As birth order studies have noted, it is
critical to control for the number of siblings (Belmont &
Marolla, 1973; Booth & Kee, 2009). Family size is inevitably correlated with birth order, so it is not possible
to isolate the effects of one without accounting for the
other. We thus controlled for CEOs’ number of siblings
(logarithm was taken) in our regression models. Because the extent of sibling rivalry may depend on the
gender composition of the siblings one grew up with,
we controlled for CEOs’ number of female siblings
(logarithm was taken). CEO ownership,6 measured as
the proportion of total outstanding shares held by a
CEO, was included as it may be related to a CEOs’
decision-making power within a firm, as well as the
6

While, ideally, we would have also controlled for CEO
compensation more broadly, these data are not available in
our empirical context. Compensation data for individual
executives in South Korea were undisclosed traditionally,
and were made partially available in 2013 (due to changes
in regulation). Even these newly disclosed data, however,
were incomplete and unsuitable for our analyses, since
compensation disclosure is required only for executives
paid in excess of 500 million won (approximately 500,000
U.S. dollars) (Kim, Lee, & Shin, 2017).
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incentive to engage in risk taking. We accounted for
economic conditions during CEOs’ upbringing, as it
may influence their level of narcissism and in turn their
risk tendencies (e.g., Bianchi, 2014). In contrast to the
mostly stagnant economy prior to the 1960s, South
Korea experienced an extremely rapid “rags-to-riches”
transformation of the economy from the 1960s until
the 1980s that has been called the “Korean Miracle”
(Kim, 1995). Therefore, we included a dummy variable that indicates whether the CEO was born during
an economic upswing (i.e., 1960s-1970s).7 To account
for potential sibling competition within the same
firm, presence of sibling executive was controlled for
as a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if there is at
least one executive in the firm who is a sibling of
the CEO.
Several firm-level controls were also included in our
empirical models. We included firm size, measured as
logged total assets. We also controlled for two different
forms of firm performance: return on assets (net income
over total assets) and Tobin’s Q (the ratio of market to
book value). To account for governance mechanisms
known to influence firm risk taking (Lim & McCann,
2014), we accounted for board size (logged number of
board members) and proportion of outside board
members (number of outside members divided by total
number of board members). We also controlled for
presence of female director (binary indicator that takes
the value of 1 if at least one woman sits on the board), as
it has a known influence on strategic risk taking (e.g.,
Post & Byron, 2015). Because of their relatedness to
firm-level risk, we also included financial leverage
(measured as a ratio of total liabilities to total sales) and
stock market b (e.g., Bromiley, Rau, & Zhang, 2017). All
models also included year fixed effects and industry
fixed effects (industry classification is based on twodigit industry codes) to account for unobserved heterogeneity across different time periods and business
domains.
Estimation Techniques
As we noted, we sampled family CEOs of public
firms associated with Chaebols. This choice may
have introduced a potential sample selection bias,
because even within Chaebol-affiliated firms there
7

In addition to these controls, we examined the impact of
step siblings from another marriage. We identified three CEOs
in our sample that grew up with half siblings due to their father
having more than one spouse. Our findings are unchanged
regardless of whether we include a dummy variable to control
for these CEOs or drop these CEOs from our analyses.
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are many instances in which nonfamily professionals serve as CEOs. Although a random sample
that included both family and nonfamily (professional) CEOs would have been ideal, this was infeasible because comprehensive family background
data (e.g., birth order, number of siblings) were not
available for nonfamily CEOs. We therefore adopted
a Heckman two-stage model to account for potential
bias due to our nonrandom CEO sampling.
Our first-stage probit model (i.e., selection model)
predicted the presence of a family CEO in our full
collection of 1,170 CEO-year observations, which
includes family and nonfamily CEOs of our Chaebolaffiliated firm sample. One challenge in properly
specifying our first-stage model was identifying exclusion restrictions that are correlated with the
likelihood of presence of a family CEO but not with
strategic risk taking (Heckman, 1979). We included
two exclusion restrictions.
Our first exclusion restriction is the business
group chairman’s number of children. This exclusion restriction is suitable for our purposes because it
should be related to the selection bias we are seeking
to correct (i.e., the selection of only family CEOs), as
more children means that there should theoretically
be a higher likelihood of a family CEO, while it
should be uncorrelated with our outcome variable
(i.e., strategic risk taking). Consistent with these expectations, we find in our data that the business
group chairman’s number of children is not significantly correlated with firm-level strategic risk taking
(r 5 2.03; p 5 –.31).
Following Bennedsen, Nielsen, Pérez-González,
and Wolfenzon (2007), we also used the gender of
the Chaebol chairman’s first child (binary variable
coded as 1 for sons) as an exclusion restriction.
Prior research has suggested that there may be a
relationship between the gender of top executives
and strategic risk taking, although the effects are
typically small (Jeong & Harrison, 2017). In this
study, however, we are measuring the gender of
the group chairman’s first child. While chairmen’s
first children (especially those who are males)
have a higher likelihood of reaching the upper
echelons based on norms of primogeniture, this is
not always the case. As such, we do not expect this
variable to be associated with a firm’s strategic risk
taking, making it a suitable exclusion restriction.
Consistent with this logic, our data indicate that
there is a nonsignificant correlation between the
first child of the business group chairman being a
son and firm-level strategic risk taking (r 5 2.05;
p 5 .16).
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This first-stage model also included firm performance, firm size, firm age, industry dummies, and year
dummies as predictors, and robust standard errors were
used. As expected, the business group chairman’s
number of children had a positive and significant influence on the presence of a family CEO (p , .01), as did
whether the business group chairman’s first child was a
son (p , .01). The coefficient for firm performance (p ,
.01) was also positive and significant. Since the business group chairman’s number of children and gender
of first child each predict the presence of family CEO,
and are not significantly correlated with our dependent variable (i.e., strategic risk taking), the exclusion
restriction criteria are satisfied (e.g., Feldman, Gilson,
& Villalonga, 2013). The inverse Mills ratio generated
from the predicted values of this model was included
in the second-stage GEE models, which we discuss
below.
In our second-stage models, we tested our hypotheses using GEEs given the nonindependent nature of the observations in our panel data. This
technique is well suited for our purposes because it
accounts for unobserved heterogeneity across firms
and CEOs, as well as autocorrelation due to repeated
measurements of these subjects over time (Liang &
Zeger, 1986). Unlike random effects models, which
require that unobserved heterogeneity across firms
and CEOs is uncorrelated with the predictor variables, GEE does not rely on these strong assumptions
(Liang & Zeger, 1986). Fixed effects models were infeasible because they do not estimate parameters for
time-invariant variables, which in our case included
our key independent variable, CEO birth order.
Given these differences, GEE is often used in longitudinal research on time invariant CEO characteristics (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007, 2011; Petrenko,
Aime, Ridge, & Hill, 2016). We specified an identity
link function, Gaussian family, and first-order autoregressive correlation structure for all of our GEE
models. Furthermore, we used robust standard errors
to account for potential misspecification of the correlation structure and heteroskedasticity (Hardin &
Hilbe, 2003).
To mitigate concerns of reverse causality, we lagged all predictor variables by one year. We also
mean-centered the continuous variables included in
the interaction terms (i.e., CEO age and closest sibling age gap) to mitigate multicollinearity problems.
RESULTS
The descriptive statistics and correlations for the
key variables are reported in Table 3. CEO birth order
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is significantly correlated with number of siblings
(r 5 .37), which is expected since a later birth order is
possible only to the extent that family size increases.
Research has shown that because these two variables
inevitably share variance, it is important to account
for both at the same time to understand the independent effects of each (Behrman & Taubman,
1986; Belmont & Marolla, 1973). The number of
siblings variable is logged, so it is worth noting that
CEOs in our sample, on average, have about five
siblings. This average family size is much higher
than what has typically been observed in recent
years. It is not surprising, however, given that the
CEOs in our sample were typically born in the
1940s–1950s in South Korea; this large family size is
in line with what is expected based on global and
local trends during that period (Kwon, Lee, Chang, &
Yu, 1975; World Bank, 2017a). Further, all of the
sampled CEOs had at least one sibling, and we were
thus able to analyze relative birth order without
having to account for only-child effects.
To investigate potential multicollinearity affecting our results, we calculated a variance inflation
factor (VIF) for each model. Average VIFs were less
than 3.2 in all models, and the maximum value for
any variable was 6.6, which is well below the typical threshold of 10 (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken,
2013). The zero-order correlation between CEO
birth order and strategic risk taking is insignificant.
However, there are correlates of both the independent and dependent variable that should be
controlled for to fully understand the relationship;
therefore, looking at bivariate correlations may not
provide great insight into birth order’s impact on
risk taking. Indeed, this is consistent with prior
birth order research, as well as prior CEO characteristics research, that have found small or nonsignificant bivariate correlations, but significant,
practical effects in multivariate models (e.g., Black,
Devereux, & Salvanes, 2005; Chen, Crossland, &
Huang, 2016; Gamache, McNamara, Mannor, &
Johnson, 2015). We now turn to the results of the
GEE models.
Table 4 reports the GEE models predicting strategic risk taking with our predictors. In Hypothesis 1,
we predicted that CEO birth order would positively
influence risk taking. According to Model 1 of
Table 4, CEO birth order has a positive and statistically significant influence on strategic risk taking
(b 5 .17; p , .05), and this holds across Models 2–4,
which include our interaction terms, and Model 5,
which includes all interaction terms. Because
our outcome variable (strategic risk taking) is
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Note: Correlations greater than |.08| are significant at p , .05.
a
Natural logarithm.

Strategic risk takinga
CEO birth order
Closest sibling age gap
CEO age
Sibling CEO
Number of siblingsa
Number of female
siblingsa
CEO ownership
Sibling executive
presence
Born during economic
upswing
Firm sizea
Tobin’s Q
Return on assets
Female director
presence
Board sizea
Outside director
proportion
Stock market b
Financial leverage

Mean

TABLE 3
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
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TABLE 4
GEE Models Predicting Strategic Risk Taking (t 1 1)
Variable
Constant
Closest sibling age gapa
Sibling executive presence
Sibling CEO
Number of siblings
Number of female siblings
CEO stock ownership
CEO agea
Born during economic upswing
Firm size
Tobin’s Q
Return on assets
Presence of female director
Board size
Outside director proportion
Stock market b
Financial leverage
Inverse Mills ratio
CEO birth order

Model 1
4.46**
(0.99)
20.11*
(0.06)
0.31
(0.22)
0.01
(0.14)
21.00**
(0.34)
0.52
(0.40)
0.58†
(0.31)
20.00
(0.01)
20.93**
(0.26)
0.94**
(0.08)
0.20*
(0.09)
0.26
(1.74)
0.23
(0.33)
0.68*
(0.27)
0.40
(0.42)
20.04
(0.18)
0.02
(0.04)
0.27
(0.52)
0.17*
(0.07)

CEO birth order 3 Closest sibling age gapa

Model 2
4.56**
(1.05)
0.25†
(0.15)
0.34
(0.23)
20.05
(0.14)
21.06**
(0.34)
0.47
(0.40)
0.56
(0.36)
0.00
(0.01)
20.84**
(0.25)
0.92**
(0.08)
0.23*
(0.10)
0.81
(1.74)
0.41
(0.41)
0.64**
(0.24)
0.45
(0.42)
20.06
(0.19)
0.02
(0.04)
0.88
(0.62)
0.20**
(0.06)
20.09*
(0.03)

CEO birth order 3 CEO agea

Model 3
4.79**
(0.99)
20.12*
(0.06)
0.37
(0.22)
0.01
(0.14)
21.05**
(0.32)
0.46
(0.41)
0.61*
(0.30)
0.01
(0.02)
21.04**
(0.30)
0.93**
(0.08)
0.20*
(0.09)
20.01
(1.77)
0.12
(0.32)
0.69**
(0.27)
0.47
(0.43)
20.03
(0.18)
0.02
(0.04)
0.10
(0.51)
0.17**
(0.06)

a

0.19*
(0.08)
Yes
Yes
503
82998.2**

Yes
Yes
503
43627.4**

Yes
Yes
503
151859.9**

Mean-centered prior to inclusion in the models. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
p , 0.1
*p , 0.05
**p , 0.01
†

4.48**
(0.96)
20.11*
(0.05)
0.30
(0.21)
20.55*
(0.26)
20.94**
(0.33)
0.43
(0.39)
0.45
(0.35)
20.00
(0.01)
20.82**
(0.23)
0.97**
(0.07)
0.28**
(0.09)
20.12
(1.69)
0.15
(0.29)
0.65**
(0.24)
0.36
(0.40)
20.04
(0.19)
0.02
(0.04)
0.09
(0.50)
0.08†
(0.04)

20.01
(0.00)

CEO birth order 3 Sibling CEO

Industry fixed effects?
Year fixed effects?
Observations
Wald x2

Model 4

Yes
Yes
503
24984.1**

Model 5
4.88**
(1.00)
0.18
(0.13)
0.38†
(0.22)
20.47†
(0.26)
21.05**
(0.31)
0.36
(0.40)
0.49
(0.38)
0.02
(0.02)
20.87**
(0.26)
0.95**
(0.07)
0.28**
(0.09)
0.14
(1.75)
0.21
(0.35)
0.62**
(0.22)
0.47
(0.41)
20.05
(0.19)
0.02
(0.04)
0.47
(0.57)
0.12**
(0.05)
20.07*
(0.03)
20.00
(0.00)
0.15*
(0.07)
Yes
Yes
503
27106.3**
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log-transformed, the magnitude of effects can be best
understood by exponentiating the regression coefficients to obtain values that can be used to infer the
percentage change in the outcome. We can infer that for
each increase in birth order, risky spending increases
by 19%. Hypothesis 1 is thus supported by our data.
Hypothesis 2 theorized that closest sibling age gap
would negatively moderate the relationship between
CEO birth order and strategic risk taking. The results
of this test are reported in Model 2 of Table 4, which
indicates that the moderating effect of closest sibling
age gap is negative and significant (b 5 20.09; p ,
0.05). This result also holds in Model 5, where all the
interaction terms are included. A graph of this
moderating effect, shown in Figure 1, allows further
investigation of this finding. Note that the Y-axis,
strategic risk taking, is depicted on a logarithmic
scale, and needs to be exponentiated for proper inference of magnitude of effects. Specifically, a oneunit increase in CEO birth order is associated with a
33% increase in strategic risk taking when the age
gap is small (one standard deviation below the
mean), whereas the increase is 9% when the age gap
is large (one standard deviation above the mean).
Hypothesis 2 is thus statistically supported.
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In Hypothesis 3, we predicted that the effects of
CEO birth order on risk taking would be negatively
moderated by CEO age. To test that idea, we entered
the relevant interaction term in Model 3 of Table 4.
The results of this model show that CEO age is not a
statistically significant moderator (b 5 2.01; n.s.),
and this nonsignificance is repeated in Model 5. As
such, our data do not statistically support Hypothesis 3.
We predicted in Hypothesis 4 that the CEO birth
order effect would be moderated by the presence of
a sibling CEO. Model 4 of Table 4, which reports
the findings of this, shows that the presence of a
sibling CEO is indeed a positive and significant
moderator (b 5 .19; p , .05). This significant
finding holds in Model 5 as well. A graph of this
moderating effect, shown in Figure 2, confirms this
pattern (again, note that strategic risk taking is
depicted on a logarithmic scale). We find that a
one-unit increase in CEO birth order is associated
with a 33% increase in strategic risk taking when
there is a sibling who is a CEO in another firm,
whereas there is a 15% increase when there is no
such sibling who is a CEO. Our findings thus support Hypothesis 4.

20
19.5
19

Strategic risk taking

20.5

FIGURE 1
Moderating Effect of Sibling Age Gap
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FIGURE 2
Moderating Effect of Sibling CEO
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Sibling CEO = 0

SUPPLEMENTAL ANALYSES
As our sample for this study was composed of 503
CEO-year observations in family business groups in
South Korea, there is a possibility that our findings
might be a false positive or attributable to aspects of
our context. With this in mind, we conducted a
number of supplemental analyses to enhance the
generalizability of our theory and findings.
Ruling Out False Positive Results
As adequately powering a study is crucial for
maximizing the value of the findings for reasons
related to both Type I and Type II errors (Button
et al., 2013; Ledgerwood, Soderberg, & Sparks,
2017), we wanted to ensure that the sample in our
primary analyses was adequately powered. To do so,
we used the G*Power program to calculate the
power of our statistical tests (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, &
Buchner, 2007). To be conservative, we assumed a
small effect size (f-squared 5 .02 using the widely
cited Cohen criteria), we set our a to .05 and power
was set at 80%, and we input that we had 45 predictors in the model. According to the power analysis via G*Power, we need a total sample size of 395

5

6

7

Sibling CEO = 1

to achieve 80% power. Given that our sample is 503,
this suggests that our statistical power is well in
excess of 80%, helping to alleviate concerns related
to power driving false positives. In addition to
this program suggesting that our study is adequately powered, scholars have noted that, when
considering power in longitudinal data, there are
a number of rules of thumb, including six to 10 observations per predictor (Neter, Kutner, Nachtsheim,
& Wasserman, 1996) and 10 observations per predictor (Howell, 1992). Given that our sample is in
excess of 500 observations and we have 45 predictors, we once again meet the generally accepted
criteria.
In addition to power being a concern as it relates
to false positives, there is a possibility that the
sample drawn is an outlier among the sampling
distribution. One means by which to reduce this
possibility is to make certain the results within a
given sample are not driven by outliers. To assess
this possibility, we winsorized our dependent variable at the 1% and 99% levels, and our results were
substantively unchanged. Finally, regarding concerns about our findings being driven by false positives, we are using robust standard errors for a more
conservative test of our hypotheses.
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U.S. Sample of CEOs

Other Analyses

To establish the generalizability of our sample
outside of CEOs of Korean business groups, we conducted a supplemental analysis examining a sample
of U.S. public firm CEOs. Specifically, we examined
data available in Ancestry.com and discovered that
this website’s most detailed records end with the
1940 U.S. census. Based on this constraint, we began
gathering data for individuals who were: (1) a CEO in
Execucomp in 1992, which is the first year it existed
(this increased the odds these CEOs would appear in
the 1940 census) and, (2) born before 1940 (so they
would be included in the 1940 census).
With these constraints in place, we performed Internet searches on this subsample of CEOs from
Execucomp in 1992. The goal of these searches was
to gather enough information so that we could be
certain the census record in Ancestry.com was the
proper record for each CEO. To do so, we needed to
find each CEO’s (1) birthdate, (2) hometown at birth,
and (3) parents’ names. When we were able to collect
of this information for a given CEO, we entered it into
Ancestry.com. Even in those cases where we had all
of this information, however, there was still often
uncertainty about whether we definitely had the
correct record—such as when the one parent’s name
was close to, but did not exactly match, the name we
found from other sources. If there was any uncertainty about the match, that CEO was excluded
from our analyses. After performing these multiple
searches, we generated a sample of 36 CEOs for
whom we could gather their birth order as well as
their sibling information from the 1940 U.S. census
or from the 1930 U.S. census (for older CEOs). We
were also able to gather most of the same controls,
except for some of our board controls, for which data
were not available.
Using the same estimation technique as for our
main analyses, we were able to replicate our main
effect of birth order on CEO risk taking (p , .05)
found in our Korean sample. We were also able to
replicate our moderating effect of closest-sibling age
gap (p , .05), and the moderating effect of age was
nonsignificant, as in our main analyses. We were not
able to gather data on whether siblings were simultaneously employed as CEOs, due lack of data
availability in regards to this variable. Thus, the
results of the three hypotheses we retested in our
U.S.-based sample are substantively similar to our
Korea-based test in terms of direction and statistical
significance, which helps to provide additional
support for the generalizability of our theory.

While we tested Hypothesis 2 using a linear measure of age gap with closest sibling, we further
examined whether the results hold when using a
discrete measure of age gap. Based on prior literature
that has suggested sibling rivalry is intensified when
the gap with siblings is less than five years (e.g.,
Sulloway, 1996), we created a dichotomous variable
coded as 1 when that condition is met. We find statistically significant support for our Hypothesis 2 in a
model predicting strategic risk taking, when interacting CEO birth order with the small age gap with
closet sibling (less than five years) variable (b 5 .27;
p , .05). The results also hold when using a moderator variable that captures age gap with closest sibling that is less than three years (e.g., Baer, Oldham,
Hollingshead, & Costa Jacobsohn, 2005).
Prior research has noted that any credible study on
birth order effects should control for number of siblings, as we do in our study, since large sibships are
biased for later-borns (Ernst & Angst, 1983). In a
meta-analysis, Sulloway and Zweigenhaft (2010)
found that studies controlling for number of siblings produced larger effect sizes than did studies
lacking this control. That is, number of siblings acts
as a suppressor variable: “a variable which increases
the predictive validity of another variable (or set of
variables) by its inclusion in a regression equation”
(Tzelgov & Henik, 1991). Consistent with this notion,
we found that in both our South Korean and
U.S. sample, the effect of CEO birth order on strategic
risk taking was not statistically significant when
number of siblings was dropped, and became significant when it was included in the regression
models. This underscores the importance of accounting for key confounds and potential suppressors, such as number of siblings, to understand the
true effects of birth order.
DISCUSSION
Birth order, which captures early-life family domain experiences, is a fundamental determinant of
individual behavior (Damian & Roberts, 2015;
Jaskiewicz et al., 2017) and has captured the attention of the general public and researchers alike.
Within the upper echelons literature, and the
broader management literature, however, “this truth
has not had much impact” (Jaskiewicz et al., 2017:
309). We thus attempt to shift the theoretical conversation surrounding CEO experiences to the family
domain—a domain that scholars have suggested may
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have a great impact, even on top executives (Smith,
2009). Drawing on evolutionary theory arguments
related to sibling rivalry, we develop theory suggesting that CEO birth order is positively associated
with strategic risk taking. To provide further evidence for our proposed sibling rivalry mechanism,
we propose three moderators to assess sibling rivalry. The results of our primary analyses using a
South Korea-based sample, a supplementary analysis of a U.S.-based sample, and other robustness
checks largely support our theorizing.
Implications
Our theorizing and results have a number of implications. First, we contribute to the upper echelons
literature by shifting the conversation around executives’ experiences to the family domain, specifically birth order. Studies within this paradigm have
primarily examined how work-related experiences
shape CEOs’ decisions (Finkelstein et al., 2009). This
primary focus on work-related experiences suggests
that researchers have little understanding of the impact of family domain experiences on CEOs, which is
problematic given that the family is arguably the
“most important and enduring of all human social
groupings” (Smith, 2009: 5). Through the construct
of birth order, we are able to shift the theoretical
conversation to a construct that captures some of the
most personal and earliest possible types of experiences. This construct may be of great importance to
our understanding of CEO characteristics, as birth
order is one of the most fundamental life experiences
and is an engrained determinant of behaviors
(Damian & Roberts, 2015; Plomin & Daniels, 1987),
regardless of cultural context (Denny, 2004).
As illustrated through our theorizing and results,
birth order in our sample does appear to influence
CEOs’ behavior. In line with evolutionary theory
arguments suggesting that the later an individual is
born in the sibling hierarchy, the more they will engage in risk taking to gain parental favor (Grable &
Joo, 2004; Sulloway & Zweigenhaft, 2010), we find
that risk-taking tendencies established in childhood
continue into the executive suite. In our sample, we
found that CEO birth order was positively related to
strategic risk taking. Specifically, we found that for
each one-unit increase in birth order, CEOs took 19%
more risk in our sample. Given the pervasive nature
of birth order, future research might also investigate other strategic decisions that CEO birth order
influences. Further, given that this research implies that a characteristic that we classify with
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experiences, birth order, potentially influences a
psychological property, risk-taking propensity, we
suggest, consistent with Finkelstein et al. (2009), that
future research might more directly address this
mutual causality, and examine the association between the two categories of characteristics.
Second, our study responds to recent calls to leverage “family science” theories to advance management research (Jaskiewicz et al., 2017) given the
important impact family experiences have on individuals (Smith, 2009: 5). Despite the fact that in the
upper echelons of organizations the demands of work
and family domains certainly interact, very little is
understood. In response, we drew on evolutionary
theory arguments to illustrate the firm-level implications of birth order and sibling rivalry on CEO risk
taking. Our findings suggest that the family environment in which a CEO grew up influences their strategic decisions. Our findings also suggest that when
the family life is present in the workplace there are
implications. Indeed, we found that having a sibling
CEO amplifies strategic risk taken by the CEO. Future
research may investigate additional implications of
CEOs having sibling CEOs, especially given that in
family business groups, multiple siblings tend to be
involved (Carney, 2008). Future research might investigate the impact of other nonwork experiences,
such as other experiences in the family domain or
even activities that CEOs might do for leisure.
Third, we contribute to the multidisciplinary birth
order literature by developing new theory regarding
moderators of birth order. While scholars have suggested that birth order effects are contingent on
moderating factors (e.g., Sulloway, 1999), little is
understood in this regard. We address this oversight
by building on evolutionary theory arguments suggesting that birth order effects are driven by sibling
rivalry, and theorizing that the extent to which sibling rivalry was present during childhood, the extent
to which childhood sibling rivalry is recalled, and
the extent to which sibling rivalry is ongoing will
moderate the CEO birth order–strategic risk taking
relationship. Our results provide support for these
ideas as the closest sibling age gap and the presence
of a sibling CEO each moderate the proposed direct
relationship. Further, even our unsupported hypothesis regarding the moderating effect of age contributes to the understanding of birth order effects.
The fact that birth order effects are not diluted over
time is itself notable. That is, whether the CEO is 35
or 93 years old (the range of CEO ages in our Korean
sample), we found no evidence that birth order effects diminished over time.
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Finally, we contribute to the literature by advancing understanding surrounding an important firm
outcome—strategic risk taking. As risk taking is a core
decision CEOs undertake and is the focus of many
corporate governance mechanisms (e.g., Eisenhardt,
1989; Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998), better understanding CEOs’ risk preferences has implications
for scholars and practitioners. Indeed, while scholars
have focused on how a number of factors shape risktaking behaviors, including the way in which a decision is framed, societal factors (e.g., Hofstede, 2001),
and confidence (e.g., Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007),
our paper shifts the focus of this literature toward a
different factor entirely—birth order. Indeed, birth
order may be considered an observable ex ante indicator of CEOs’ attitude toward risk, and thus may
influence how they frame risk taking.
Limitations and Future Research
This study is not without limitations. First, like
many studies on CEOs, we were concerned with
endogeneity, especially sample-selection bias (i.e.,
sample-induced endogeneity) given that we sampled
family CEOs associated with Chaebols due to data
availability. While these issues can never be ruled out
completely, we took a number of steps to mitigate
these concerns. First, we tested our hypotheses using a
Heckman two-stage model: in the first stage we estimated a model that predicts the likelihood of family
CEO presence with a set of predictors that includes
exclusion restrictions, and those results were used to
calculate an inverse Mills ratio included in the secondstage GEE (AR1) models. Our data are also uniquely
suited to deal with endogeneity concerns, given that
the key predictors in both stages of the estimation—
i.e., gender of first-born child in the first stage and birth
order in the second stage—were clearly determined
exogenously, at the time of individuals’ birth. Thus,
our approach allowed a stringent and conservative test
of our proposed hypotheses.
Second, while evolutionary theory suggests that
sibling rivalry drives birth order effects, like most
archival research on CEOs we were not able to directly test the sibling rivalry mechanism. That said,
in testing our theoretical arguments for our moderators we were able to empirically examine factors that
may be indicative of past and present sibling rivalry,
specifically age spacing and the presence of a sibling
CEO, as well as the extent to which CEOs may recall
childhood sibling rivalry based on age. Scholars
have suggested that moderators can help provide
further evidence for a theorized mechanism (Baron &
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Kenny, 1986; Shi et al., 2017); thus, while we were
not able to directly test our mechanism, these moderators provide additional evidence for our proposed
sibling rivalry mechanism.
Third, we used CEOs of business groups, or
Chaebols, in South Korea to test our theory. Scholars
have made calls to conduct empirical research in
international contexts, including in those that have
different sociocultural contexts from Western countries. As such, our context may be considered a
strength of our study given that family firms comprise the majority of publicly traded firms in the
world (La Porta et al., 1999), even in the United States
where widely held corporations are thought to pervade (Feldman et al., 2016; Villalonga & Amit, 2009,
2010), and that business groups make up a large
percentage of family firms (Masulis, Pham, & Zein,
2011). It is possible, however, that the South Korean
context influenced the relationship between CEO
birth order and strategic risk taking, and thus this
relationship could be different in other countries or
in other business forms. The fact that we were largely
able to replicate our results in a U.S.-based sample of
public firms, however, helps alleviate these concerns. These data, however, have some limitations,
including that they comprise a relatively small
sample and that there are truncation issues as it is
possible that the families in our sample continued to
have more children after 1940. While this would not
change any of our CEOs’ birth rank, it does mean that
two of our control variables—number of siblings and
number of female siblings—may not be entirely accurate. Future research may thus explore the impact
of executive birth order in other countries to help
understand its generalizability. Using Ancestry.com
coupled with census data, future research may be
able to build a more expansive dataset of CEOs with
which to examine the effects of CEO birth order.
Alternatively, scholars may find success gathering
birth order data in other countries where family
business groups are common and are closely scrutinized, such as those countries listed in Table 1.
Fourth, a limitation of our study is that that all the
CEOs in our primary and supplementary analyses
were males. As we noted, this is not surprising given
that South Korea ranks low in global studies of gender equality (World Economic Forum, 2016), and
that, unfortunately, the underrepresentation of female CEOs is consistent with many settings across
the world, including the United States (Favaro et al.,
2014). That said, scholars have found that CEO gender may alter important relationships in the upper
echelons (e.g., Jeong & Harrison, forthcoming); thus,
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future research might examine how birth order impacts male versus female CEOs in samples where
there are enough female CEOs to have adequate
power. Given that many scholars have examined
birth order in samples that included both male and
females, we expect scholars to find that birth order
effects persist for female CEOs, albeit with potentially weaker effects suggested by prior work (e.g.,
Argys et al., 2006; Gilliam & Chatterjee, 2011)
Finally, we did our best to control for as many relevant factors as possible; however, we were not able to
control for some factors that might serve as potential
confounds. For example, we were not able to examine
other TMT members’ birth order given that these individuals were typically not family members and thus
their birth order and sibling data were not publicly
available. We also were not able to control for potentially important personality factors of CEOs, such as the
Big Five, given the noted reluctance of CEOs “to submit
to batteries of psychological tests” (Finkelstein et al.,
2009: 50; see also Cycyota & Harrison, 2006; Nadkarni
& Chen, 2014). That said, our supplementary analysis
of U.S. CEOs helps to combat a potential omitted variable problem. Still, future research might examine
whether these findings hold while controlling for some
of these aforementioned factors.
CONCLUSION
The order in which we are born shapes us in profound ways, and we find that CEOs are no exception.
The later the order of birth, the more strategic risk
CEOs undertake, and this tendency is more pronounced when the conditions for sibling rivalry (a
key mechanism explaining birth order effects) are
salient due to small age gaps with their siblings and
the presence of a sibling CEO. Contrary to our theorizing, the impact of CEO birth order on strategic risk
taking does not diminish as CEOs age. This unexpected finding reinforces the idea that birth order
effects have a strong lasting effect on individuals,
including CEOs. We believe this study helps advance management research, the broader multidisciplinary “family science” literature, and the much
needed cross-pollination of ideas between the two.
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La Porta, R., López de Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. 1999.
Corporate ownership around the world. The Journal
of Finance, 54: 471–517.
Lasko, J. K. 1954. Parent behavior toward first and second
children. Genetic Psychology Monographs, 49: 97–137.
Ledgerwood, A., Soderberg, C. K., & Sparks, J. 2017. Designing a study to maximize informational value. In
M. C. Makel & J. A. Plucker (Eds.), Toward a more
perfect psychology: Improving trust, accuracy, and
transparency in research: 33–58. Washington, D.C.:
American Psychological Association.
Lee, S. H., & Song, S. 2012. Host country uncertainty, intra‐
MNC production shifts, and subsidiary performance.
Strategic Management Journal, 33: 1331–1340.

August

Masulis, R. W., Pham, P. K., & Zein, J. 2011. Family business groups around the world: Financing advantages,
control motivations, and organizational choices. Review of Financial Studies, 24: 3556–3600.
McNerney, A., & Usner, J. 2001. Sibling rivalry in degree
and dimensions across the lifespan. The nature of human nature: Student research feedback and peer review. Retrieved from http://jrscience.wcp.muohio.edu/
Research/humannautre01/FinalArticles/SiblingRivalryin
DegreeandDimensionsAcrosstheLifespan.html. Accessed
December 12, 2017.
Milne, F., & Judge, D. 2009. Birth order influences reproductive measures in Australians. Human Nature,
20: 294–316.
Morgan, E. M. 2009. The heir and the spare: Impact of
birth order on risk attitudes, discount rates, and
behaviors. Ann Arbor, MI: ProQuest.
Myers, S. A., & Goodboy, A. K. 2006. Perceived sibling use
of verbally aggressive messages across the lifespan.
Communication Research Reports, 23: 1–11.
Nadkarni, S., & Chen, J. 2014. Bridging yesterday, today,
and tomorrow: CEO temporal focus, environmental
dynamism, and rate of new product introduction.
Academy of Management Journal, 57: 1810–1833.
Nadkarni, S., & Herrmann, P. 2010. CEO personality, strategic flexibility, and firm performance: The case of the
Indian business process outsourcing industry. Academy of Management Journal, 53: 1050–1073.

Levinson, H. 1971. Conflicts that plague family businesses.
Harvard Business Review, 49: 378–387.

Neter, J., Kutner, M. H., Nachtsheim, C. J., & Wasserman,
W. 1996. Applied linear statistical models. Chicago,
IL: Irwin.

Li, J., & Tang, Y. 2010. CEO hubris and firm risk taking in
China: The moderating role of managerial discretion.
Academy of Management Journal, 53: 45–68.

Nicholson, N., Soane, E., Fenton‐O’Creevy, M., & Willman,
P. 2005. Personality and domain‐specific risk taking.
Journal of Risk Research, 8: 157–176.

Liang, K. Y., & Zeger, S. L. 1986. Longitudinal data analysis
using generalized linear models. Biometrika, 73: 13.

Nisbett, R. E. 1968. Birth order and participation in dangerous sports. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 8: 351–353.

Lim, E. N. K., & McCann, B. T. 2014. Performance feedback
and firm risk taking: The moderating effects of CEO
and outside director stock options. Organization
Science, 25: 262–282.

Pasta, D. J. 2009. Learning when to be discrete: Continuous vs. categorical predictors. Paper presented at the
SAS Global Forum, Washington, D.C.

Long, J., & Freese, J. 2006. Regression models for categorical dependent variables using Stata (2nd ed.).
College Station, TX: Stata Press.

Patel, P. C., & Cooper, D. 2014. Structural power equality
between family and non-family TMT members and
the performance of family firms. Academy of Management Journal, 57: 1624–1649.

Luo, X., Kanuri, V. K., & Andrews, M. 2014. How does CEO
tenure matter? The mediating role of firm‐employee
and firm‐customer relationships. Strategic Management Journal, 35: 492–511.
Malthus, T. R. 1798. An essay on the principle of population, as
it affects the future imporvement of society, with remarks
on the speculations of Mr. Godwin, M. Condorcet, and
Other Writers. London, U.K.: The Lawbook Exchange.

Peng, M. W., & Jiang, Y. 2010. Institutions behind family
ownership and control in large firms. Journal of Management Studies, 47: 253–273.
Petrenko, O. V., Aime, F., Ridge, J., & Hill, A. 2016. Corporate social responsibility or CEO narcissism? CSR
motivations and organizational performance. Strategic Management Journal, 37: 262–279.

2019

Campbell, Jeong, and Graffin

Plomin, R., & Daniels, D. 1987. Why are children in the
same family so different from one another. Behavioral
and Brain Sciences, 10: 1–16.
Post, C., & Byron, K. 2015. Women on boards and firm
financial performance: A meta-analysis. Academy of
Management Journal, 58: 1546–1571.
Prendergast, C., & Stole, L. 1996. Impetuous youngsters and
jaded old-timers: Acquiring a reputation for learning.
Journal of Political Economy, 104: 1105–1134.
Puffer, R., & Serrano, C. V. 1973. Patterns of mortality in
childhood: Report of the Inter-American Investigation
of Mortality in Childhood. PAHO Scientific Pub.,
vol. 262. Washington D.C.: Pan American Health
Organization.
Pyke, K. 2005. “Generational deserters” and “black sheep”:
Acculturative differences among siblings in Asian
immigrant families. Journal of Family Issues, 26: 491–
517.
Radovanovic, D. L. S., & Lebowitz, S. 2016. How your birth
order predicts the rest of your life, Business Insider.
Retrieved from https://www.businessinsider.com/whatyour-birth-order-says-about-you-2016-9. Accessed November 7, 2017.

1305

Shi, W., Zhang, Y., & Hoskisson, R. E. 2017. Ripple effects
of CEO awards: Investigating the acquisition activities
of superstar CEOs’ competitors. Strategic Management Journal, 38: 2080–2102.
Siegel, J. 2007. Contingent political capital and international alliances: Evidence from South Korea.
Administrative Science Quarterly, 52: 621–666.
Smith, S. R. 2009. Exploring family theories. New York,
NY: Oxford University Press.
Sorenson, R. L. 1999. Conflict management strategies used
by successful family businesses. Family Business
Review, 12: 325–340.
Steelman, L. C. 1985. A tale of two variables: A review of
the intellectual consequences of sibship size and
birth order. Review of Educational Research, 55:
353–386.
Stocker, C. M., Lanthier, R. P., & Furman, W. 1997. Sibling
relationships in early adulthood. Journal of Family
Psychology, 11: 210.
Suitor, J. J., & Pillemer, K. 2007. Mothers’ favoritism in later
life: The role of children’s birth order. Research on
Aging, 29: 32–55.

Rohde, P. A., Atzwanger, K., Butovskaya, M., Lampert, A.,
Mysterud, I., Sanchez-Andres, A., & Sulloway, F. J.
2003. Perceived parental favoritism, closeness to kin,
and the rebel of the family: The effects of birth order
and sex. Evolution and Human Behavior, 24:
261–276.

Sulloway, F. J. 1995. Birth order and evolutionary psychology: A meta-analytic overview. Psychological
Inquiry, 6: 75–80.

Ross, H. G., & Milgram, J. I. 1982. Important variables in
adult sibling relationships: A qualitative study. Sibling relationships: Their nature and significance
across the lifespan: 225–249.

Sulloway, F. J. 1999. Birth order. In S. R. Pritzker & M. A.
Runco (Eds.), Encyclopedia of Creativity: 189–202.
San Diego, CA: Academic Press.

Royle, N. J., Hartley, I. R., Owens, I. P., & Parker, G. A. 1999.
Sibling competition and the evolution of growth rates
in birds. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London.
Series B, Biological Sciences, 266: 923–932.
Sanders, W. M. G., & Hambrick, D. C. 2007. Swinging
for the fences: The effects of CEO stock options on
company risk taking and performance. Academy of
Management Journal, 50: 1055–1078.
Scharf, M., Shulman, S., & Avigad-Spitz, L. 2005. Sibling relationships in emerging adulthood and in
adolescence. Journal of Adolescent Research, 20:
64–90.
Schwartz, S. H. 1994. Beyond individualism/collectivism:
New cultural dimensions of values. In U. Kim, H.
Triandis, C. Kagitcibasi, S.-C. Choi, & G. Yoon (Eds.),
Individualism and collectivism: Theory, method,
and applications: 85–119. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Serfling, M. A. 2014. CEO age and the riskiness of corporate policies. Journal of Corporate Finance, 25:
251–273.

Sulloway, F. J. 1996. Born to rebel: Birth order, family
dynamics, and creative lives. New York, NY: Pantheon Books.

Sulloway, F. J. 2001. Birth order, sibling competition, and
human behavior. In H. R. Holcomb (Ed.), Conceptual
Challenges in Evolutionary Psychology. Studies
in Cognitive Systems, vol 27: 39–83. Norwell, MA:
Springer.
Sulloway, F. J. 2007. Birth order. In C. A. Salmon & T. K.
Shackelford (Eds.), Family relationships: An evolutionary perspective: 162–182. New York, NY: Oxford
University Press.
Sulloway, F. J., & Zweigenhaft, R. L. 2010. Birth order and
risk taking in athletics: A meta-analysis and study of
major league baseball. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 14: 402–416.
Tooby, J., & Cosmides, L. 1992. The psychological
foundations of culture. In J. H. Barkow, L. Cosmides,
& J. Tooby (Eds.), The adapted mind: Evolutionary
psychology and the generation of culture: 19–136.
New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Trivers, R. L. 1974. Parent–offspring conflict. Integrative
and Comparative Biology, 14: 249–264.

1306

Academy of Management Journal

Tzelgov, J., & Henik, A. 1991. Suppression situations in
psychological research: Definitions, implications, and
applications. Psychological Bulletin, 109: 524–536.
Villalonga, B., & Amit, R. 2009. How are U.S. family firms
controlled? Review of Financial Studies, 22: 3047–
3091.

August

GGGR16/WEF_Global_Gender_Gap_Report_2016.pdf.
Accessed September 15, 2017.
Xu, Y., & Zheng, Y. 2014. Birth order and sibling sex ratio in
relation to sexual orientation in China. Social Behavior and Personality, 42: 995–1001.

Villalonga, B., & Amit, R. 2010. Family control of firms and
industries. Financial Management, 39: 863–904.
Wang, G., Holmes, R. M., Oh, I. S., & Zhu, W. 2016. Do CEOs
matter to firm strategic actions and firm performance?
A Meta‐analytic investigation based on upper echelons theory. Personnel Psychology, 69: 775–862.
Wang, X.-T., Kruger, D. J., & Wilke, A. 2009. Life history
variables and risk-taking propensity. Evolution and
Human Behavior, 30: 77–84.
White, L. 2001. Sibling relationships over the life course: A
panel analysis. Journal of Marriage and the Family,
63: 555–568.
Williams, R. 2016. Ordinal independent variables.
Retrieved from https://www3.nd.edu/;rwilliam/
xsoc73994/OrdinalIndependent.pdf. Accessed June
7, 2017.
Wiseman, R. M., & Gomez-Mejia, L. R. 1998. A behavioral
agency model of managerial risk taking. Academy of
Management Review, 23: 133–153.
World Bank. 2017a. Fertility rate, total (births per woman).
Retrieved from https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
sp.dyn.tfrt.in. Accessed June 1, 2018.
World Bank. 2017b. GDP (current US$). Retrieved from
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ny.gdp.mktp.cd.
Accessed July 10, 2018.
World Economic Forum 2016. Global Gender Gap Index
2016. Retrieved from http://www3.weforum.org/docs/

Robert J. Campbell (rob.campbell@unl.edu) is an assistant professor of management at the University of
Nebraska-Lincoln. He received his PhD in strategic
management from the University of Georgia. His research takes a behavioral approach and focuses on
strategic leadership, CEO succession, and stakeholder
evaluations.
Seung-Hwan Jeong (sjeong@gsu.edu) is an assistant
professor of strategic management at Georgia State
University’s J. Mack Robinson College of Business. He received his PhD in management from The University of
Texas at Austin. His research interests include behavioral
strategy, corporate governance, strategic leadership, and
organizational ambidexterity.
Scott D. Graffin (sgraffin@uga.edu) is the Synovus Chair in
Servant Leadership & Professor of Strategic Management at
the University of Georgia’s Terry College of Business, and
is also an international research fellow at Oxford University’s Centre for Corporate Reputation. He received his
PhD in strategic management from the University of Wisconsin, Madison. His research interests include corporate
governance, as well as the impact of reputation, status, and
organizational impression management activities on organization outcomes.

Copyright of Academy of Management Journal is the property of Academy of Management
and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without
the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or
email articles for individual use.

